Abstract: consider a finite graph, with an actor sitting at each node, and a
dollar on each edge. Negotiations will be conducted between pairs of
adjacent actors over splitting the dollar on the intervening edge.
At the end of negotiations, each actor may sign at most one contract with a
neighbour, agreeing on some possibly uneven split of the dollar.
How much money is each actor likely to receive? And which matchings of the
graph are likely to arise?
Kleinberg and Tardos analysed the limiting answer - a balanced solution -
that arises from assuming that actors iteratively revise current deals using
Nash bargaining, taking the best alternative deal currently available as a
backup.

Most of the talk will be expository, I'll explain the concepts of Nash bargaining and balanced solution. If there is time, I will discuss
the rate of
convergence to the balanced solution of this type of negotiation.